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THE ILLEGAL ISSUE AND OVER-ISSUE OF
CAPITAL STOCK OF CORPORATIONS.
THE conception of a corporation was taken from the civil
law. The susceptibility of corporations to fraud and perversion was soon recognized, so that at the civil law under the
empire a special permission from the State for their creation
became necessary, and by the pagan emperors was granted
with great reluctance: Taylor on Corp. § 4. At the common
law a corporation could never be created like a partnership,
merely by a contract between the individuals composing it.
The right of acting in a corporate capacity is a special privilege, which may not be assumed without authority from
some governing power: Alorawetz on Pri. Corp. § 4; State v.
Bradford, 82 Vt. 58. The necessity for these restrictions is
occasioned principally by the limited liability of the corporators, and therefore the capital stock, the sole fund to which
creditors have recourse, as well as being a favorite subject for
investment, is hedged in, jealously, by statutory restrictions.
What is the effect of the illegal creation of certificates of
stock by agents of a corporation, who covinously and secretly issue such certificates?
The solution of this question is dependent, in part, upon
that of another, which is as to the extent of the liability of a
corporation for the acts of its agents. The Maryland Court
of Appeals, in Tome v. ParkersburgBranch -B. R., 89 Md. 71,
adopt the language of Story on Agency, § 452: "It is a genVOL. XXXVI.-86
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eral doctrine of law, that, although the principal is not ordinarily liable in a criminal suit for the acts or misdeeds of his
agent, unless, indeed, he has authorized or co-operated in those
acts or misdeeds; yet he is liable to third parties in a civil
suit for the frauds, deceits, concealments, misrepresentations,
torts, negligence, and other malfeasances or misfeasances and
'omissions of duty of his agent in the course of his employment, although the principal did not authorize, or justify, or
participate in or indeed know of such misconduct, or even if
he forbade the acts or disapproved of them. In all such cases
the rule applies respondeat superior; and it is founded upon
public policy and convenience." The Court go on and quote:
"As natural persons are liable for the wrongful acts and neglects of their servants and agents, done in the course and
within the scope of their employment, so are corporations,
upon the same grounds, in the same manner, and to the same
extent: Ang. & Ames on Corp. § 310 ; Albert v. Savings Bank
of Baltimore, 1 Md. Oh. 407; Thatcher v. Bank of . Y, 5
Sand. 121 ; Thonpson v. Bell, 10 Exch. 10; Bargate v. Shortridge, 5 H. of L. Cas. 297 ; .National-ExchangeBank v. Drew,
32 Eng. Law & Eq. 1; Stevens v. Boston and M#aine R. R.,
1 Gray, 277; Blackstock v. I. Y and Erie B. B., 1 Bosw.
77.
In the case of the Western 3id. B. R. v. Franklin Bank, 60
Mfd. 43, ALVEY, C. J., says, "Strictly speaking, corporations
while acting within the scope of the powers delegated to
them, cannot be guilty of wilful fraud, yet it is settled by a
great number of decided cases, that corporations carrying on
trade or business of any kind, are equally and to the same
extent liable for the frauds and wrongs of their agents, perpetrated in the course of their employment, as individual
principals would be under like circumstances: Story, § 452;
Grammer et al. v. Nixon, 1 Strange, 653.
In causes of action arising out of tort, the doctrine of ultra vires is inapplicable. "A great distinction exists between
tortious and contractual liability for acts ultra vires. It is no
defence to legal proceedings in tort, that the torts were ultra
vires. If the torts have been done by the corporation or by
their direction, they are liable for the results, however much
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in excess of their powers such torts may be :" Green's Brice's
Ultra Vires, 265; Sharp v. M1ayor, 40 Barb. 277; Taylor on
Corp. § 338; Alexander v..Beefe, 74 Mo. 495. This distinction,
with the reason therefor, is succinctly stated in the recent case
of Salt Lake City v. Hallister, 118 U. S. 263. "It remains to
be observed that the question of the liability of corporations on
contracts which the law does not authorize them to make and
which are wholly beyond the scope of their powers is governed
by a different principle. Here the party dealing with the
corporation is under no obligation to enter into the contract.
No force, or restraint, or fraud is practised on him. The
powers of these corporations are matters of public policy,
open to his examination, and he may and must judge for himself as to the power of the corporation to bind itself by the
proposed agreement." The reports are full of cases to this
effect: Phila. 1Vil. and Balto. R. B. v. Quigley, 21 How. 202;
Carter v. the .Howe Machine Co., 51 Md. 290 ; Balto. . Yorktown Turnpike Co. v. Boone, 45 Md. 344; Cook on Laws of
Stock and Stockholders, § 293; Paley on Agency, §§ 294-6.
Even malice has been imputed to them and exemplary damages allowed; cases cited supra, and Phila. TVil. etc. B. B.
v. Larkin, 47 Md. 155; Same v. Hoefich, 62 Id. 300.
Attention, however, must be directed to the decision of the
English Court of Appeals in the case of British Banking Co.
v. Charnwood -Forest-B'y,etc., L. R. 18 Q. B. Div. 714 (1887),
overruling the decision reported in 34 Weekly Rep. 718.
It was an action brought to recover damages for fraudulent
misrepresentations alleged to have been made by the defendant corporation through their secretary. It appeared at the
trial, that certain customers of the bank had applied to them
for an advance on the security of transfers of debenture stock
of the defendant company. The plaintiff's manager called
upon T., the defendant's secretary, and was informed in effect
that the transfers were valid, and that the stock which they
purported to transfer existed. The plaintiff thereupon made
the advances. It subsequently appeared that T., in conjunction with one M., had fraudulently issued certificates for debenture stock in excess of the amount which the company
were authorized to issue, and the transfers concerning which
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plaintiffinquired related to this over-issue. Lord ESHER, IN.R.,
held, that although what the secretary stated related to matters about which he was authorized to speak, he did not
make the statements for the defendants but for himself. And
he followed the rule laid down by WILLES, J., "That the

master is answerable for every such wrong of his servant or
agent as is committed in the course of his service and for his
master's benefit, though no express command or privity of the
master be proved :" Barwick v. Eng. Joint Stock Bank, L. R.
2 Ex. 259. The case of the British Banking Co. v. Charmcood,
etc., is cited with approval by Bigelow on the Law of Frauds
(1888), 225-6-7. While this preliminary and elementary
proposition is well settled, still to justify a recovery, it is
necessary that the certificate have all the indicia of genuineness. Thus, the agents must have apparently observed all
the formalities which are required by the charter or the articles of association to be observed in the particular class of
corporate transactions. It has been held that when the charter requires contracts of a particular description to be signed
by corporate officers or approved in a certain manner, no
agent can bind the company, unless the contract be executed
in the manner prescribed: Morawetz on Corp. § 582 ; Badger
v. Am. Ins. Co., 103 Mass. 244; Head v. Prov. Ins. Co., 2
Craneh, 127 ; Henning v. U. S. Ins. Co., 47 Mo. 425.
"Defences by a corporation that certificates were not issued
in conformity with the charter or by-laws are not considered
with favor by the Courts. But where the charter provides
that certificates of stock should be signed by the president,
directors, and treasurer, fraudulent over-issue signed by president and treasurer alone were held not sufficient to charge
the corporation :" Holbrook v. The Fauquier & Alexandria
Turnpike Co., 3 Cranch (C. C.), 425 ; Cook on Law of Stock
& Stockholders, § 295. This principle is again enunciated
in the case of The Granger's Life Ins. Co. v. Kamper, 73
Ala. 341.
When a corporation relies upon a grant of power from the
Legislature to do an act, it is as much restricted to the mode
prescribed by the statute for its exercise as it is to the particular thing allowed to be done: Aug. & A. on Corp. § 111;
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Farmers'Loan Co. v. Carroll,5 Barb. 613. In the case of
Bissell v. Spring Valley Ibwnship, 110 U. S. 162, it was prescribed by statute that the bonds to be issued by a county in
payment of the subscription to the stock of a railroad, if it
should be determined by the electors to make such subscription, should be signed by the chairman of the board of county
commissioners and attested by the clerk. Upon a suit by a
holder of one of these bonds, upon which the clerk's attestation was lacking, it was held, "that the law required the
bonds to be executed in a particular manner, and the signature of the clerk is essential to the valid execution of them,
even though he had no discretion to withhold it. That there
can be no estoppel, because they are not the bonds of the
defendant :" MATTHEWS, J. To the same effect, see Taylor on
Pri. Corp. § 253.
A person who deals with a corporation must, at his peril,
take notice of its charter or articles of association ; and this
rule holds good whether the charter be contained in a public
or private Act of the Legislature. It follows, therefore, that
so far as the authority of an agent of a corporation is defined
by its constitution the scope of the agent's powers must
always be considered as disclosed: -Mor.on Corp. (1st ed.)
§ 64. This, however, is only as to the formalities prescribed
by its charter or articles of association ; the by-laws of a private corporation being binding upon none but its members
and officers: Tome v. Parkersburg,etc., 39 Md. 75; Ang. & A.
Corp. § 359; Mfor. § 64.
The question which now presents itself is, when these
essentials of form have apparently been complied with, what
are the rights of holders of stock fraudulently issued by the
company's agents, the fraud being contained in matter extrinsic to the certificate? The general proposition is well
established, by the decisions, that where the authority of the
officers of a corporation to bind it by their acts depends upon
the performance of a condition precedent, or the existence of
an extrinsic fact, and the question of compliance with the
condition or the existence of the fact is to be determined by
them or rests peculiarly within their knowledge, their representation, which may consist in the mere doing of the act,
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that the condition has been complied with, or that the fact
does exist, may be relied on by one acting in good faith, and
is conclusive and binding on the corporation: -. Y
-X
I. I. v. Schuyler, 34 N. Y. 30; lOer. Bank v. State Bank, 10
Wall. 604, 644 ; De Voss v. Richmond, 18 Gratt. 338 ; Orleans
v. Platt, 99 U. S. 676; Coloma v. Eaves, 92 Id. 484; Henry v.
-hicollay,95 Id. 618; Miners' Ditch Co. v. Zellerbach, 37 Cal.
543; Knox v. Aspinwall, 21 How. 539; Ross v. Mayor & City
Council, 51 Md. 270. The case of the B.
0. R. v. 1lilkens,
44 Md. 28-9, is distinguished from these by MILLER, J., in
delivering the opinion in that case; he says, "To the general
doctrines on which our decisions in these stock cases were
based, there is. and must be the exception of the recognized
and well-settled principle of the common law in reference to
bills of lading." The pole-star by which the Courts have
been guided, has been the highly just principle laid down by
Lord HOLT, in the case of Hern v. Nicholls, 1 Salk. 289: "Seeing somebody must be a loser by this deceit, it is more reasonable that be that employs and puts a confidence in the
deceiver should be a loser than a stranger." The pioneer
cases in this country are those of the Schuyler frauds in
New York. The early -NewYork cases are in much confusion, but the position in that State was finally established
by the case of N. Y J- N. IL R. v. Schuyler, 34 N. Y.
30. I propose to briefly sketch the course of the New York
Court. In the case of the lechanics' Bank v. N. Y & NIIV.. R.,
13 N\. Y. 599, the by-laws passed in conformity with the charter declared that all transfers of stock should be made in the
transfer-book, kept at the proper office, and where a certificate of stock had been issued, that the same should be surrendered before transfer made. It was shown that the agent of
the defendant had fraudulently given to K., a particeps criniris, a certificate in the usual form for eighty-five shares of
stock, when in fact the latter owned no stock, no certificate
for such stock had been surrendered, and no stock stood in his
name on the books; the plaintiff, in good faith, and in reliance
upon the certificate as regularly issued and valid, made a loan
to K., receiving from him the certificate, with an assignment
of the stock, and a power of attorney to transfer the same.
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The Court held the plaintiff not entitled to recover. This
case is minutely analyzed in 34 N. Y. 30, by DAVIS, J. :
"From the manner in which the decision of the Judge is
stated in the Mechanics' Bank Case, it is difficult to tell what
precise points were designed to be passed upon by the Court.
It is open to conjecture that the case may have passed off on
the ground of want of privity between the plaintiffs and defendants, as was intimated by SELDEN, J. (16 N. Y. 142), or on
the ground as suggested in Griswold v. Haven, 25 N. Y. 599,
that K., to whom the certificate was issued, being privy to
the fraud, had of course no claim against the company, and
that his assignee could have no greater rights than himself.
But that it was not decided on any question of privity, we
have the authority of the Judge who pronounced the opinion:
'We certainly,' he says, ' did not put our judgment upon
the ground that the plaintiffs were not in privity of dealing
with the defendants by reason of the non-negotiable character
of the certificates, and, therefore, could not sue for fraud:"' 16
N. Y. 151 ; 34 Id. 60-1. If, however, the decision was based
upon the lack of privity the New York Courts have certainly
retraced their steps. In 34 N. Y. 30, the Court adopt the
language of the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas (Bank
of Kentucky v. Schuylkill Bank, 1 Parsons Sel. Eq. 180): "To
entitle the aggrieved party to sue in such case, no privity is
necessary, except such as is created by the unlawful act
and the consequential injury, because the injured party is
not seeking redress upon contract, but purely for the tortious
act in his commission of which the contract is an accidental
incident." Likewise, in Bruff v. Mali, 36 N. Y. 206, "1No
privity is necessary except such as is created by the unlawful
act and the consequential injury." Also, Titus v. Great Wes.
Turnpike, 5 Lans. 250 ; s. c. 61 N. Y. 280. But whatever
may have been the views of the other members of the Court,
there is no mistaking the ground on which the Judge who
pronounced the opinion intended to put the liability of a
principal for the acts of an agent. It is, in brief, that a principal is bound only by the authorized acts of his agent. The
Judge acts upon the impression that the case of the .Morth
River Bank v. Aymar, 3 Hill, 262, had been reversed by the
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Court of Errors, and then lays down the proposition, that the
principal is liable for the appearance of the power, but not for
the appearance of the act. In 34 N. Y. the Court say:
"There is an irrepressible conflict among the New York authorities as to whether a party dealing with an agent, who is
within the apparent scope of his authority, must inquire into
the extrinsic facts which rest peculiarly within the knowledge
of the agent and which cannot be ascertained by a comparison
of the power with the act done under it. The solution of it
depends upon whether the decision of the .North River Bank
Case, is law." By the later cases of The Farmers', etc.
Bank v. The Butchers', etc. Bank, 16 9. Y. 142, and Griswold
v. Haven, 25 Id. 599, its authority is upheld; likewise by
Iestfield Bank v. Cornew, 37 N. Y. 320. The 3fecha is'
Bank Case is thus substantially overruled, and the authority
of the NAorth River Bank Case vindicated. The case of the
Mechanics' Bank v. N . Y. J- IV. f. B., 4 Duer, 480, is now
the law.
The case of the N . Y. J. hf. R. v. Schuyler, 34 N. Y. 30,
was one in which the secretary issued certificates of stock in
his own name, fraudulently and in excess of the charter
limit. The Court said: "So in this case, in the narrower
view in which we are now considering it, the condition upon
which the agent could issue the certificate was a transfer in
the books and the surrender of a previous certificate, if any
had before been issued. These facts are wholly extrinsic and
peculiarly within the knowledge of the agent as part of the
special duties to be attended to by him, and were represented
by him to exist by the certificate itself. Where the principal
has clothed his agent with power to do an act upon the existence of some extrinsic fact necessarily and peculiarly
within the knowledge of the agent, and of the existence of
which the act of executing the power is itself a representation,
a third person dealing with such an agent in entire good
faith, pursuant to the apparent power, may rely upon the
representation, and the principal is estopped from denying
its truth to his prejudice :" 34 N. Y. 73; s. c. 3 Hill, 262.
The stock being issued beyond the charter limit, the question
arose as to whether the stock purporting to be created by the
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false certificates could be valid stock. "In the nature of
things it is impossible. A corporation with a fixed capital
divided into a fixed number of shares can have no power of
its own volition, or by any acts of its officers and agents to
enlarge its capital or increase the number of shares into which
it is divided. The supreme legislative power of the State can
alone confer that authority and remove or consent to the removal of restrictions which are part of the fundamental law
of the corporate being; and hence every attempt of the corporation to exert such a power before it is conferred by any
direct and express action of its officers is void; and hence
every indirect and fraudulent attempt to do so is void." The
bonafide holders of the fraudulent certificates were adjudged
to be entitled to indemnity. This decision was followed in
Bru/f v. Mali, 36 N. Y. 205, which was also a case of fraudulent over-issue by the officers of a corporation. The Court
say, 1a joint action will lie against the principal and agent:
.Phelps v. Wait, 30 N. Y. 78; or a separate action against
either: Suydam v. Moore, 8 Barb. 858. The wrongful act is
the servant's, in fact, the principal's, by construction."
In Titus v. Great West. Turnpike Co., 5 Lans, 250; s.c.61
N. Y. 280, these cases were re-affirmed. "A corporation is
liable for money advanced to the treasurer upon certificates
of shares of stock of the company, signed in conformity with
such resolutions, issued to the treasurer himself, although the
shares were in fact spurious and fraudulently issued, it appearing that they were taken by the plaintiff in good faith."
Also in The People ex rel. Jenkins v. Parker Vein Coal Co., 10
How. Pr. 551.
In Holbrook v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 57 N. Y. 621, the liability is based upon the doctrine of estoppel. It cannot now
be denied that if a corporation, having power to issue stock
certificates, does, in fact, issue such a certificate, in which it
affirms that a designated person is entitled to a certain number
of shares of stock, it thereby holds out to persons who may
deal in good faith with the person named in the certificate
that he is an owner and has capacity to transfer the shares.
This does not rest on any view of the negotiability of stock,
but on the general principle appertaining to the law of esVOL. XXXVI.-87
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top pel. The certificate itself must be regarded as a continuous
representation of the ownership of the holder; it is equivalent
to an affirmative answer to an inquiry made at the office of
the company.
The recent cse of The Manhattan Beach Co. v. larned, in
the U. S. Circ. Ct. S. Dist. N. Y., May 8, 1886, 23 Blatch.
494; s. c. 27 Fed. Rep. 484, sanctions this doctrine of estoppel.
"The purchaser need not inquire to ascertain whether the person to whom a certificate has been issued has the legal title
to the shares when such title is only transferable upon the
books of the corporation; it is their duty toward every person who may become a purchaser upon the faith of a certificate, to exercise due diligence in his behalf. Hence it follows
that if by their negligence or even by their own malfeasance
a certificate has been issued by agents of the corporation
whilst acting within the general scope of their powers, the
purchaser has a right to rely upon the truth of the recitals
and to treat them as the formal representations of the corporation made by those who are entitled to speak for it in the
particular transaction." But the Court make this exception
to a right of recovery, which, however, was unnecessary to a
decision of the case. The certificate had been issued in the
name of a fictitious person; from this fact the learned Judge
reasons: "That the consequences of a purchase which could
not have been consummated without the forgery or fraud of
the person who prepared the spurious assignment and power
of attorney, an act for which the plaintiff is not responsible,
cannot be attributed to the complainant." The damage was
caused by the taking of the certificate and not from its issuance. But the company was held estopped for permitting
a transfer of the certificate.
There have been repeated adjudications in Pennsylvania
also. The case of the Bank of Kentucky v. Schuylkill Bank,
1 Pars. Sel. Eq. 180, is an able presentation of the law and
philosophy of the subject. The Schuylkill Bank was the
Philadelphia agent of the Bank of Kentucky, to make transfers of stock and issue certificates for such stock as was
originally subscribed there. The cashier of the Schuylkill
Bank illegally issued certificates, under the authority con-
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ferred on his bank, beyond the limit fixed by the charter.
The Court of Common Pleas, KING, President, delivering the
opinion, held that the obligation to surrender the old certificates was not a limitation on the power of permitting transfers so far as respected the bank, but a provision intended for
the security of the bank, and that it was not true that the
purchaser of the stock was under any obligation to see that
such surrender was made by the seller. "The idea that the
purchaser of stock is to lose the property he has honestly paid
for, because the bank has not done its duty to itself, is unreasonable to the last degree." The bank was held responsible,
although the stock had been issued beyond the limit fixed in
the charter; bonafide holders were entitled to indemnity, but
not to become stockholders,
The case of Willis v. Phila. &' D. B. Co., 13 Phila. 34; s. c.
6 IV. N. C. (Pa.) 461, was likewise a case of fraudulent overissue by the agents of the corporation. "The argument, that
to hold, that the president and treasurer could by a fraudulent over-issue, bind the company to that which the company
was powerless to perform, might be unanswerable if the
power to give certificates was identical with the power to
create stock. * * * If a certificate of stock is not a negotiable instrument, it is a written declaration that the holder
has a definite share in the capital or profits of the concern,
which though delivered to him is intended for circulation and
virtually addressed to all the world, and third parties who
are misled by such instruments may justly require that the
loss shall fall on the corporation and not on them." These
cases were affirmed in People's Banik v. Kurtz, 99 Pa. St. 346,
where the facts were the same. The Maryland Court has
followed these decisions to their fullest extent. In Toie v.
The ParkersburgBranch, etc., 39 Md. 36, the facts were these:
By the by-laws of the corporation, and from matters apparent upon the face of the certificates, it was prescribed that
all certificates should be signed by the president and treasurer
and the corporate seal affixed. A certain C. was the transfer
agent and treasurer of the company, and kept in his custody
the transfer books and the corporate seal. The president,
being a non-resident and absent at times, signed certain blank
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certificates and intrusted them to C. C. fraudulently and for
his own benefit issued certificates of stock, some with the
genuine signature of the president, upon others it was alleged
the signature of the president had been forged. The plaintiff
advanced money upon certain of these certificates, issued in
the name of the lender and one in the name of the broker
through whom the loans were effected. The Court had no
difficulty as to the genuine certificates, and ALvEY, J., in his
dissenting opinion, says: "These prayers maintain that if the
signature of the president to the certificates be genuine, the
fraud of the transfer agent in issuing the certificate for his
own benefit, and not that of the company under the facts
stated, the plaintiff being innocent, does not affect the right
of the holder to recover; and of this I think there should be
no doubt." While the Court was unanimous upon this
branch of the case, ALVEY, J., and BARTOL, 0. J., dissent
from the view taken by the Court, as laid down in the third
prayer, which was substantially that even if the signature of
the president should be found to be forged, still the plaintiff
was entitled to recover if the certificates were forged by C.,
and were issued by him from the defendant's office, and were
taken by the plaintiff in good faith. The Court say that "it
is essential to public welfare, that where the acts of acknowledged agents are accompanied with all the indicia of genuineness, and are issued for a valuable consideration, the principal
should be responsible, whether the indicia are true or not."
They cite with approval the doctrine as to extraneous facts,
laid down in North River Bank v. Ayinar. They disclaim
any intention of basing their judgment upon the negligence
displayed by the corporate officers, and say that independently
of that aspect of the case, there was enough in the facts mentioned in the prayers, to have entitled the plaintiff to recover:
Id. 85-6. ALVEY, J., in dissenting, says, "that if the representation of the transfer agent in respect to the signature of the
president, is to conclude the corporation, then his representation as to the genuineness of the seal and every other act of
authentication must equally conclude; thus rendering nugatory all the checks that corporations may have devised." By
reference to the opinion of the same Judge, delivered in the
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case of the IWestern .Md. B. v. Franklin Bank, 60 Ald. 36, it will
be seen that he recognizes the wisdom and authority of the
decision of Tome v. Parkersburg,etc.
In the case of the Western 3d. B. v. FranklinBank, the signatures of the president and treasurer were left with a clerk,
a son of the treasurer, during the enforced absence of these
officials. The clerk forged the name of the treasurer of the
Safe Deposit Company to the receipt for coupons which was
attached to the funding certificate issued by the company and
negotiated them with persons aware of the fact that he held
the position of clerk. The Court say: "It may be conceded,
and was doubtless the case, that the agent had no authority
in fact to issue such certificates; he had no real authority as
between himself and his principal, or other parties conusant
of the facts, for doing the particular acts complained of. But
the company, by its own act, and as it turned out, misplaced
confidence, placed the agent in a position to do, and procure
to be done, that class and description of acts to which the
particular acts in question belong; and in such case, where
the particular acts in question are done in the name of and
apparently on behalf of the principal, the latter must be answerable to innocent parties for the manner in which the
agent has conducted himself in doing the business confided to
him. Upon no other principle could the public venture to
deal with an agent. In such case the apparent authority
must stand as and for the real authority." They held further, "that no distinction should be made where parties deal
in such certificates in the regular course of business, without
ground of suspicion, because they happen to be in the hands
of a party who is an agent of the company, or because they
happen to represent on their face that the coupons had been
deposited by such person."
The same question which was involved in the case of Tome
v.ParkersburgBranch 1B. 1?., etc., arose recently in England
and received a like adjudication. This was the case of Sltaw
v. Port Philip and Colonial Gold Mining Co., L. R. 13 Q. B.
Div. 103. The secretary of the company, without any authority, affixed the seal of the company, which was in his
custody, to certificates of stock, and either himself forged the
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signature of a director, or procured it to be forged, and issued
it. STEPHEN, J., said, "It is admitted on behalf of the defendant that, if there had been merely a false issue of the certificates in the absence -of the directors, it would have bound
the company. But it is contended that the present case differs from these because the director's name was forged, and
that the secretary carried out his fraud by means of forgery.
How does this make any difference? It is said that it does
so because no decision has ever yet given validity to a forged
document. It is asserted that there is a distinction between
forgery and other fraud, but I fail to see that it is so. A director is to sign every certificate and certain other formalities are to be observed. These formalities had in the present
case apparently been observed. The person who receives the
certificate knows whether he received it from the secretary,
but he cannot verify the due observance of the other formalities. I think therefore that the company has made it part
of the duty of the secretary and within the scope of his authority to warrant the genuineness of each certificate he issues,
and that the plaintiff in this case is entitled to our judgment."
This case is also cited with extended comments in 24 A3NiERICAN LAW REGISTER,

90. The Supreme Court of the United

States has laid itself open to criticism, which has not been
long in forthcoming, by its decision of the case of Mlioores v.
Citizens' National Bank of iqua,111 U. S.156. The cashier
of the bank obtained a loan of money from the plaintiff upon
the faith of a certificate of stock duly signed by the president
and cashier of the bank and issued in the name of the plaintiff. The certificate contained the usual provision that the
stock was transferable only on the books of the bank, in person or by attorney, on the surrender of this certificate. The
Court, by most refined reasoning, concluded that the case was
distinguishable from such cases as that of Titus v. Great West.
Turnpike Road, 61 N. Y. 237, by the circumstance that in that
case" the certificate was issued in the name of the person who as
officer of the corporation had issued them and not in the name
of the person to whom they were transferred. That having distinct notice that the surrender and transfer of a former certificate
were pre-requisite to the lawful issue of a new one, and having
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accepted a certificate that she owned stock without taking
any steps to assure herself that the legal pre-requisites to the
validity of her certificate, which were to be fulfilled by the
former owner and not by the bank, had been complied with,
she does not, as against the bank, stand in the position of one
who receives a certificate of stock from the proper officers
without notice of any facts impairing its validity." This case
has been severely criticised, and, it seems, with much reason,
that the provision in the by-laws and upon the face of the
certificates provided solely that that certificate could only be
transferred upon a surrender of the certificate, and did not refer to prior certificates: Lowell on the Transfer of Stocks,
§ 112 (note). In this connection may also be cited the case of
West. Md. R. v. Franklin Bank, supra, and the language of
TANEY, C. J., in the case of Lowry v. Commercial and Farmers'
Bank: Taney's Decisions, 316. "In general, a party must be
presumed to have notice of everything that appears upon the
face of the instrument under which he claims title. But a
transfer of stock cannot in this respect be likened to an ordinary conveyance of real or personal property. The instrument
transferring the title is not delivered to the party; the laws
require it to be written on the books of the bank in which
the stock is held; the party to whom it is transferred rarely,
if ever, sees the entry and relies altogether upon the certificate
of the proper officer of the bank, stating that he is entitled to
so many shares. And that the purchaser need not look beyond
the certificate, or examine the books of the corporation to
ascertain the validity of the transfer." See also ,.alisbury
Mills v. Townsend, 109 Mass. 115; Taylor on Corp. § 598.
The text-writers have formulated the principles deducible
from these cases substantially as laid down in 2 Mor. on Corp.
§ 761. "A bona fide purchaser of certificates for shares in a
corporation, issued in due form by agents of the company
having authority to issue such certificates under ordinary circumstances, can compel the corporation to recognize the certificate as valid and accord to him the rights of a shareholder,
unless the creation of new shares is prevented by some legal
prohibition; and if the shares which the certificate purports
to represent cannot legally be created, by reason of some legal
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prohibition, the purchaser is entitled to recover his damages
from the corporation for the false representation contained in
the certificatS :" Taylor, § 591; Cook, Law of Stocks, § 298;
Pollock on Contracts, § 94. Redfield in his work on Railways maintains the contrary doctrine and follows Mechanics'
Bank v. N. Y. & N. -H.R., 13 N. Y. 599, as does Field on
Corp. § 144.
It is a general rule that where the whole amount of the
corporate stock has been issued and the corporation becomes
liable, either to issue certain certificates to a wronged person
or pay him damages, that the Court having no authority to
direct such an issue, can only give judgment that the corporation pay damages: Cook on Law of Stocks, etc. § 284;
-Peopleex rel. Jenkins v. Parker Vein, etc. Co., 10 How. Pr.
551 ; Finley Shoe Co. v. .Kurtz, 84 Mich. 89. Courts have no
power, by mandate or decree, or in any other manner, to effect
an increase or reduction of the capital stock: Cook, § 284;
Williams v. Savage Mf'g Co., 8 Md. Ch. 418: Baker v. Wasson, 59 Tex. 140; Smith et al. v. N. Am. A. Co., I Nev.
423 ; 2 Mor. § 683. But in Massachusetts a rule prevails to
the effect that the corporation in such a case may be compelled to issue the stock, and to prevent an illegal over-issue
it must purchase an equal amount of shares in the market:
Boston, etc. Co. v. Richardson, 135 Mass. 478; Machinists'
-NationalBank v. Field et al., 126 Id. 345; Pratt v. Taunton
C. X. Co. et al., 128 Id. 110 ; Lowell on Transfer of Stocks,

§ 116.
The injured party can sue the directors in a separate action,
if they knowingly pledge over-issued stock: National Exchange Bank v. Sibley, 71 Ga. 726; Ashbury v. Watson, 54 Law
T. Rep. 30; Bruff v. Mali, 86 N. Y. 200; Cazeaux v. Mali,
25 Barb. 578; or jointly with the corporation, or the corporation in a separate action: Cook, § 295.
The vendor of a share of stock impliedly warrants that the
same is issued by the duly constituted officers of the company,
and is sealed with the genuine seal of the corporation; but he
does not impliedly warrant that such shares have not been
fraudulently issued by the officers in e :cess of the charter
limit. If this prove to be the case, the vendee has no recourse
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against him: People's Bank v. Kurtz, 99 Pa. St. 846; Cook,
§ 296; Mor. § 761; State v. North La. B., 84 La. An. 947;
Seitzer v. Mali, 41 N. Y. 619.
The measure of damages is the market value of the stock
at the date of demand by the holder for a transfer, or if no
demand were made, at the date of filing the bill, subject to
such lien as would properly have attached to genuine stock
under similar conditions: In re Bahia& San Francisco R., L.
R. 3 Q. B. 595 ; The Phila. & Darby R. Cases, 13 Phila. 44;
99 Pa. St. 844, 513. Consequently, when certificates of stock
contain apparently all the essentials of genuineness, a bona
fide holder of such certificates has a claim to recognition as a
stockholder, if such stock can legally be issued, or to indemnity
if this cannot be done; the fact of forgery does not extinguish
such right when it has been perpetrated by or at the instance
of the officer placed in authority by the corporation and intrusted with the custody of its stock-books and held out by
the company, in the language of the Court, in the case of B.
a 0. B. ?. v. Wilkens, 44 Md. 28-9, "as the source of information on the subject." But there may be two exceptions to
this general proposition: (1) The dictum of WALLACE, J.,
in Manhattan Beach Co. v. liarned,U. S. Cir. Ct. S. Dist. N.
Y., May 10, 1886, 23 Blatch. 494, that where a certificate is
issued in the name of a fictitious person there can be no recovery, unless a transfer has been effected upon the company's
books; (2) That laid down by the Supreme Court in Moores
v. The Citizens' Bank, etc., 111 U. S. 156, that one dealing
with the transfer agent of the company and receiving a certificate in his (the transferee's) name, does not stand in the
position of a bonafide holder without notice.
What are the consequences of the increase of capital stock
by a corporation acting directly as a body or through its
agents, who openly and under color of authority make such
increase; such issuance being in excess of the corporate
powers or in an unauthorized manner.
There is a well-defined distinction drawn by the Courts and
text-writers between an irregular increase and the over-issue
of capital stock. Cook, in his recent work on the Law of
Stocks and Stockholders, lays down the proposition that" where
VOL. XXXVI.-88
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the full capital stock of a corporation has been issued and
there is no charter, or statutory provision authorizing an increase of the stock, it is clear that any issue of stock in excess of the capital is not a legitimate increase of the capital
stock. It is unauthorized and illegal, and it is termed in law
an over-issue of stock. There is a clear distinction between
over-issued stock and an irregular increase of stock. The
former exists when it is made, although no increase of the
stock is authorized by the charter or by statute. The latter
occurs when there is a statutory or charter provision authorizing an incresse of the stock, but the formalities prescribed for
making the increase have not been strictly complied. with.
Over-issued stock is void, while an irregular increase of stock
is merely voidable." Cook, § 291.
In the following section the same author says that overissued stock is wholly void, whether it be the result of accident, mistake, or want of knowledge, or it be due to fraud
and substantial wrongdoing. The animus or intent of the
parties is not material. So rigid and well established is this
rule that not even a bonafide holder of such stock can give to
it any validity or vitality. It is void: § 292.
Morawetz, against his inclination, is forced to acknowledge
this distinction; he regrets that a distinction should be made
between defacto corporations and shares issued defacto without authority. "Two rules, however, seem to be well established in the United States by force of the actual decisions:
(1) If a corporation has no legal right to increase the amount
of its capital stock upon any terms, shares created in excess
of the amount authorized by the charter or law under which
the corporation was organized will be treated by the Courts
as null and void. (2) If a corporation is authorized by law to
increase its capital stock upon complying with certain prescribed forms and conditions, and the corporation or its agents
appear to have endeavored to comply with the prescribed
forms or conditions, and have in fact increased the company's
capital stock by issuing new shares on the assumption that the
legal right to increase the capital stock had been acquired,
and if the holder of such new shares has acted as a shareholder and enjoyed the rights of a shareholder, then the crea-
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tion of such new shares will be recognized by the Courts and
given effect according to the intention of the parties, although
the statutory forms or conditions were not complied with,
and no legal rights to create the new shares were in fact obtained :" 2 Mor. § 763. To the same effect, Taylor, § 541;
Boone, § 114; Waterman (1888), §§ 190, 208.
The first of these rules rests upon the ground that the
creation of shares in a corporation without legislative authority is prohibited by the common law, and that the contracts of membership represented by shares created in violation of the common-law prohibition will not be recognized
and enforced by the Courts: 2 Mor. § 764. Over-issued stock
is void by reason of its being ultra vires, the corporation
being prohibited by the common law, and contrary to public
policy. "The term ultra vires, whether with strict propriety
or not, is used in different senses. An Act is said to be ultra
vires when it is not within the scope of the corporation to
perform it under any circumstances, or for any purpose. An
Act is also sometimes said to be ultra vires with reference to
the rights of certain parties, when the corporation is not authorized to perform it without their consent; or with reference to some specific purpose, when it is not authorized to
perform it for that purpose, although fully within the scope
of the general powers of the corporation, with the consent
of the parties interested, for some other purpose. And the
rights of strangers dealing with the corporation may vary
according as the act is ultra vires in one or the other of these
senses. When an Act is ultra vires in the first sense mentioned, it is generally, if not always, void in toto, and the corporation may avail itself of the plea. But when it is ultra
vires in the second sense, the right of the corporation to avail
itself of the plea will depend upon the circumstances of the
case :" Bissell v. Mich. J&Southern B., 22 N. Y. 262-289; .Mivers' Ditch Co. v. Zellerbach, 37 Cal. 578.
In this connection it may be stated, that when the company
is organized under a general incorporation law, the act itself
generally provides that the amount of the capital stock be
fixed and specified in the articles of association. This pre-
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scribes and limits the amount of stock as fully as though it
had been fixed by a special charter: Cook, § 279.
A corporation has no implied power to vary the amount of
its capital stock as originally fixed; and every attempt of the
corporation to exert such power before it is conferred, by any
direct or express act of its officers, is void: Boone, § 114;
N. Y &. N. -H. B. v. Schuyler, 34 N. Y. 80; Curry v. Scott,
54 Pa. St. 270 ; Wood v. -Dummer, 3 Mason, 308 ; Railway v.
Allerton, 18 Wall. 233 ; Salem, etc. v. Ropes, 6 Pick. 23 ; 2 Mor.
§ 434 ; Taylor, § 133 ; Smith v. Goldsworthy, 4 Q. B. 430;
Smith v. Am. Co., 1 Nev. 428.
That corporations have not an implied power to effect
changes in the amount and number of capital stock seems to
be settled law: Green's Brice (2d ed.), 158; Thompson on
Liab. of Stockholders, § 115; Lathrop v. Kneeland, 46 Barb.
432; Mutual Life Ins. v. McKelway, 12 N. J. Eq. 133.
In the case of Seignouret v. Home Ins. Co., U. S. Circ. Ct.
E. Dist. La., July 2, 1885, 24 Fed. Rep. 332, which was a
suit to restrain the company from reducing its capital stock,
it was held that a provision, for the better conduct find management of the affairs of the company, for a special general
meeting called for the purpose from time to time to amend,
alter or annul, either wholly or in part, all or any clauses of
said deed, or of the existing regulations and provisions of the
company, did not authorize a reduction of the number and
value of the shares of the company. The power to dissolve
does not carry with it the power to change the capital stock,
which was substantially forming a new corporation. Also,
Droitwich Co. v. Curzon, L. R. 3 Ex. 35; In re _Ebw. etc. Co.,
L. R. 4 Oh. Div. 827; In re .inancial Co., L. R. 2 Ch. App.
714; Society v. Abbott, 2 Beav. 559. If a corporation is created with a fund limited by the Act, it cannot enlarge or diminish that fund, but by license from the Legislature, and if
the capital stock is parcelled out into a fixed number of
shares, this number cannot be changed by the corporation
itself: Salem, etc. v. Ropes, 6 Pick. 32; Oldtown Road v. Veazie, 39 Me. 521; 1 Dane's Abr. 0. 22, A. 1.
A number of cases representing the different phases of this
question have been before the Supreme Court of the United
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States, for adjudication. In the case of Chubb v. Upton, 95 U.
S.667-8, upon the trial Chubb had objected to the production in evidence of the proceedings by which the company
increased its stock, upon the ground of their alleged irregularities, and of informalities in the papers filed in the public
offices. The Court said, "It is settled by the decisions of the
Courts of the United States and by the decisions of many of
the State Courts, that one who contracts with an acting corporation cannot defend himself against a claim on such contract, in a suit by the corporation, by alleging the irregularity
of its organization. The same principle applies to the case
of a subscription to the capital stock, in an organization
which has attempted irregularly to create itself into a corporation, and has acted as such. The rule applies to increasing
the stock of the corporation, when the question arises upon
paying a subscription for stock forming a part of such increase. The duty and necessity of performing the contract
of subscription are the same as in the case of an original
stockholder. The statute of Illinois authorizing an increase
of the capital stock, papers were filed under the law for that
purpose, which were examined by the Attorney-General, and
certified to be in due form; and the company proceeded to
issue its stock upon that theory. The defendant became a
subscriber and attended meetings. It is idle to deny that this
was the case of an organization which claimed to have taken
and apparently supposed it had taken, the measures required
by law to complete its increase of capital. It acted as such,
and the defendant, by receiving his certificate of stock, entered into engagements with it as such. If it be conceded
that its increased stock be but de facto, and that it could have
been annulled or suppressed by the action of the AttorneyGeneral as acting under an irregular organization, the defendant derives no aid from the admission. The cases cited are
clear to the point that he cannot make the objection, but
must perform the engagements he has made." In the case of
Pallinanv. Upton, 96 U. S.328, the Court say, "whether the
corporate stock had been properly increased, was a question
the State only could raise." To the same effect see Upton v.
Bansbrough, 3 Biss. 421; Upton v. Hainborn, Id. 417; Upton
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v. Jackson, 1 Flippin, 413 ; Upton v. Tribiloek, 91 U. S. 45;
Thompson on Liab. of Stockholders, § 410.
The case of Scovill v. Thayer, 105 U. S. 143, contains a review of the law on this subject. The Fort Scott Co. was organized. under the general incorporation law of Kansas, which,
therefore, with its articles of incorporation, constituted its
charter. By these articles the original stock of the company
was fixed at $100,000 ; ch. 28, § 14, of the statutes of Kansas
provides "that any corporation may increase its capital
stock to any amount not exceeding double the amount of its
authorized capital." "The second issue increased the stock to
$200,000, which was the limit prescribed by the charter. The
question, therefore, is whether the stock of the third and
fourth issues, by which the aggregate amount was raised to
$400,000, is or is not void. To decide that the holders of
stock issued ultra vires have the same rights as the holders of
authorized stock is to ignore and override the limitations and
prohibitions of the charter. We think it follows that if the
holders of such spurious stock have none of the rights, they
can be subjected to none -of the liabilities of a holder of genuine stock. His contract to pay for spurious stock is without
consideration and cannot be enforced. It is insisted that the
defendants, having attended, by proxy, the meetings at which
the increase of the stock beyond the limit imposed by law was
voted for, and having received the certificates for the stock
thus voted for, and after such increase the company by its
agents having held itself out as possessing a capital of
$400,000 and invited and obtained credit on the faith of such
representation, he is now estopped from denying the validity
of the stock and his obligation to pay for it in full. We
think that he is not estopped to set up the nullity of the unauthorized stock. It is true that it has been held by this
Court that a stockholder cannot set up informalities in the
issue of the stock which the corporation had the power to
create. But these were cases where the increase of the stock
was authorized by law. The increase itself was legal and
within the power of the corporation, but these were simply
informalities in the steps taken to effect the increase. A distinction must be made between shares which the company had
no power to issue and shares which the company had power
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to issue, although not in the manner in which or upon the
terms upon which they have been issued. The holders of the
shares which the company had no power to issue in truth had
nothing at all, and are not contributors" (citing 2 Lindley
on-Part. 138). The case of Stace and Worth is cited with approval; that was a case of illegal consolidation of two corporations ; two holders of stock of the consolidated company applied to have their names taken from the list of contributors
upon the winding up of the company. The Vice-Chancellor
said this was a void agreement with a void acting upon it, a
void recognition and a void ratification by the acts which have
been mentioned. It comes to an aggregate of nothings, and
that aggregate of nothings is all that there is to fix those gentlemen on the list of stockholders. Upon the principles stated
in these authorities we are of opinion that the defendant is
not estopped by any acts of his to assert the invalidity of the
stock issued in excess of the limit authorized by the charter
and to deny his liability thereon. Nor is he estopped by the
acts of the agents of the company. The officers of the company had no authority to make these representations, and the
public has no right to trust them. Persons dealing with the
managers of a corporation must take notice of the limitations
imposed upon their authority by the act of incorporation.
The laws secured to the public and the creditors an infallible
mode of ascertaining the real capital of the company. They
were bound to know that the law permitted no such increase
of its capital stock as the company had attempted to make,
and that any representation that it had been made was false.
A creditor who has been defrauded by misrepresentations of
the real capital of the company has his remedy in an action
of tort against all who participated in the fraud. GRAY and
FIELD,

JJ., dissented.

These cases are contrasted in the case of Veeder v. .Mudgedt,
95 N. Y. 310. In this case the meeting at which the stock was
increased was not formally called, nor was the certificate of the
increase of capital made and filed as prescribed by statute.
The stock was all issued to stockholders who had voted for
the increase and who subsequently received dividends thereon.
The Court held them estopped, citing Eaton v. Aspinwall,
19 N. Y. 119; Aslinwall v. Saceld, 57 Id. 331; Buffalo &'
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Albany .B. v. Cary, 26 Id. 75 ; Kent v. Quicksilver, etc. Co., 78
Id. 159, and Shelton v. .Eickenmyer, 90 Id. 618, in support.
Distinguishing this case from that of Scovill v. Thayer, they
say, "But where, as in the present case, the abstract power
did exist, and there was a way in which the increase could
lawfully be made, and the creditors could without fault
believe that this increase had been lawfully effected and the
necessary steps had been taken, then the doctrine of estoppel
may apply and the increased stock be deemed valid as against
the creditors who have acted upon the faith of such increase.
We must therefore treat the increase as lawful and precisely
as if the needed preliminary steps had in truth been taken."
In the case of The Grangers' Life Ins. Co. v. Kamper, 78
Ala. 825, the Court say that "this case, like that of Scovill
v. Thayer, the attempt to increase the stock of the company
beyond the limit fixed by its charter was ultra vires. The
stock itself was therefore void. It conferred on the holder
no. rights, and subjected them to no liability."
Again, in the recent case of Pool v. The West PrintButter,
etc. Assn., U. S. Circ. Ct. Dist. Neb., March 28,1887, 80 Fed.
Rep. 518, the formalities required by the statutes of Nebraska,
with respect to an increase of the capital stock, were not complied with. The Court say: "One other matter is suggested,
and that is, the illegality of the increase of stock from
$25,000 to $250,000, and the limitations, both in the charter
of the company and the statutes of Nebraska, against the
amount of the indebtedness. The complainants hold only
stock which was thus irregularly issued, and I do not think
it lies in their mouth--or, indeed, in the mouth of any of the
original stockholders, cognizant of the fact and assenting
thereto-to question the liability of the corporation for the
entire debt created in favor of the Middleton Bank. No man
can plead his own wrong to defeat an honest debt: Kansas
City Hotel v. Harris,51 Mo. 464; Clark v. Thomas, 34 Ohio
St. 46 ; Kent v. Quicksilver, etc. Co., 78 N.Y. 180 ; Story's Eq.
Jur. § 1589, are authorities also sustaining the liability of
holders of irregularly increased stock: -Pullmanv. Upton, 96
U. S. 828, that of a transferee of such stock, although he may
have taken such shares as collateral; and Kansas City Hotel
v. Hunt, 57 Mo. 126, that of a subscriber subsequent to the
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issue of the stock; but the Court say that the mere subscription, without any payment thereon, or any other act of recognition, will not bind the defendant. When a subscriber has
done nothing by which he may be held estopped, he may
decline to receive stock improperly issued, and may be in a
position to defend in a suit brought to enforce his subscription
to it: Sturges v. Stetson, U. S. Circ. Ct. S. Dist. Ohio, 1858, 1
Biss. 246; Taylor, § 541. Assent may be shown as conclusively by acquiescence as by a formal vote; Lawe's Case, 1
DeG., J. &S. 504; Payson v. Stoever, 2 Dill. 428; Cook, § 285.
M1orawetz, on the other hand, denies that it is founded
upon estoppel. In most of the cases in which the rule was
applied, the failure to comply with the statutory condition,
precedent to the right of issuing the shares, was a matter of
public record of which the parties were bound to take notice.
Moreover, the rule has been applied in favor of the corporation and of the parties who participated in the violation of
the law: 2 Mfor. § 764.
When the power is given to increase or decrease the capital
stock or the number of shares into which it is divided, the
mode of proceeding indicated by the statute or articles of
association must be substantially adhered to: Taylor, § 133;
Spring Co. v. Knowlton, 103 U. S. 49; Knowlton v. Congress
S pring Co., 57 IT. Y. 518.
Over-issued stock may, however, it seems, be legalized by
a subsequent legal increase of the capital stock: Sewell's Case,
L. R. 3 Ch. Ap. 131 ; N. Y. & N. H. B. B. Co. v. Schuyler, 34
N. Y. 56-7; Cook, § 292. In Oler v. _Balto. .RandallstownB.,
41 Md. 583, this state of facts was presented to the Court.
The company had obtained subscriptions for stock beyond
the limit fixed by its charter, and upon suit, to recover Oler's
subscription, it was met with the defence that the taking of
subscriptions beyond the prescribed amount released him.
The Court held, "that if he had been a subscriber for the
additional unauthorized shares, there could be no recovery
against him; but that being one of the earliest subscribers,
and there being stock not issued, he was liable."
In Jlerrill v. Beaver, 50 Ia. 404, it was decided, that the
corporation has illegally increased its stock, is no defence to
VOL. XXXVI.-89
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a note given for a subscription, when it is not alleged that the
illegal cannot be distinguished from the legal stock.
Upon investigation, it is apparent that the validity of
irregularly issued stock is based upon its analogy to the case
of a de facto corporation: Chubb v. Upton, 95 U. S. 667-8;
Scovell v. Thayer, 105 Id. 143. The question of irregularly
issued stock has not yet been presented to the Maryland
Courts, and their decision cannot be anticipated with any
degree of confidence. Maryland reports almost alone present
cases where defects of incorporation apparent upon the face
of the certificate of incorporation have prevented the recognition of bodies so organized as corporations defacto. The
case of Boyce v. Trustees, etc. of the A. E. Church,46 Md. 859,
was a suit against the church, to which it set up its own incapacity as a defence: the Court say, "The statute law of the
State expressly requiring certain prescribed acts to be done to
constitute a corporation, to permit parties indirectly, or upon
the principle of estoppel, virtually to create a corporation for
any purpose, or to have acts so construed, would be in manifest opposition to the statute law, and clearly against its
policy, and justified upon no sound principle in the administration of justice," and held the church not to be estopped.
That the weight of authority is overwhelmingly the other
way, see Taylor on Corp. § 146 et seq. ; Thompson, § 410 et
seq. ; Mor. §§ 736-761. The Maryland Court applied the
same rule in the case of Franklin Fire As.Co. v. Hart, 31
Md. 59 ; Grape Sugar, etc. Co. v. Small, 40 Id. 395. The
Courts have based their decisions as to the validity of stock
irregularly increased, upon the responsibility of defacto corporations, and whether the Maryland Court will follow the
analogy set by its own judgments cannot be forecast. The
statutes as clearly provide in this case, as in the case of the
original incorporation of a company, that the capital stock
may be increased or diminished by complying with the provisions of the following sections, which prescribe the nature
of the notice and the character and form of the certificate
to be recorded.
LEwiS PUTZEL.
Baltimore.

